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PREFERENCES ARISING FROM TRUST RELATIONSW HERE property has once been impressed with a trust, the
quality inheres therein and in the proceeds thereof so long
as the trust relation continues, provided the rights of a bonafide
purchaser for value and without notice do not intervene and identi-
fication remain possible. The trust impress, in the absence of a
superior equity, at once places property in the preferred class. In
equity, trust property belongs to the cesiui que trust, and his claim
to it cannot be defeated by the insolvency or dishonesty of the
trustee, if it constitutes, in an identifiable form, a part of the
trustee's estate. It goes without saying that, under such circum-
stances, it is beyond the reach of the general creditors of the
trustee. In order that this doctrine may be applied and a prefer-
ential claim for trust property enforced against the estate of an
insolvent; it is not necessary that the relation between the insolvent
and the claimant be technically that of trustee and cestui que trust.
It may be a quasi trust relation, such, for example. as that existing
between principal and agent or bailor and bailee. Further, in order
to defeat fraud and in the interests of honesty and fair dealing,
equity may thrust the trust relation upon a party. Whenever the
title to property has been fraudulently obtained, it is, in equity,
held by the transferee for the benefit of the defrauded party;
and an appeal to the proper equitable remedy will always be sus-
tained whenever the remedy furnished by the law is inadequate.
The proceeds of negotiable securities, for example, that have been
stolen and sold, may be impressed with a trust in the hands of the
felonious taker or his assignee with notice. Equity, in such a case,
"will raise a trust in invitum out of the transaction, for the very
purpose of subjecting the substituted property to the purposes of
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indemnity and recompense." I If the property that is the subject
of a trust, either express or implied, is in the possession of the insol-
vent trustee, or his assignee for the benefit of creditors, or if the
proceeds thereof have been invested in other property that can be
clearly identified as a part of the insolvent's estate, the problem is
an easy one. The property, whether in its original or in a changed
form, belongs in equity to the cestui que trust, and the court of
equity will protect his interests as against general creditors. But
when trust property has become so mingled with the private prop-
erty of the trustee that identification in specie or by way of substi-
tuted property becomes impossible, the problem assumes a more
complicated form. It is with this phase of the subject that this
article will principally deal.
To what extent and under what circumstances will equity recog-
nize and enforce a preferential lien in favor of a cestui que trust as
against the general estate of an insolvent?
In the discussion of the question and in an examination of
cases bearing thereon, we should keep before us a few fundamental
principles. It is quite apparent that a failure to do this has resulted
in extreme views that have led to confusion. In order that a
preference may be enforced in favor of a cestui que trust, it is
obvious that the facts of the case must show a trust relation and not
simply the relation of debtor and creditor. In the absence of a trust
relation, there can, of course, be no cestui que trust. And the trust
relation must be connected with property. After the dissipation of
property that has been the subject of a trust, the trust relation,
although perhaps formally in existence, is in reality, so far as prop -
erty is concerned, at an end. Under such circumstances, the cestui
que trust becomes simply a general creditor. It is identifiable prop-
erty to which the trust attaches, that gives the relation life and that
forms the basis of a preferential claim. Excepting as his claim is
connected with property that constitutes a part of the estate of the
insolvent, the trust creditor is not entitled to preference over gen-
eral creditors. The mere fact that a claim has arisen out of a trust
relation, either express or implied, does not, of itself, give a right
to preference. "It is clear," says the court in Matter of Cavin v.
Gleason, "that upon an accounting in bankruptcy or insolvency, a
trust creditor is not entitled to a preference over general creditors of
the insolvent, merely on the ground of the nature of his claim, that
is, that he is a trust creditor as distinguished from a general creditor.
I Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y. 133.
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We know of no authority for such a contention. The equitable
doctrine that as between creditors equality is equity, admits, so far
as we know, of no exception founded on the greater supposed
sacredness of one debt, or that it arose out of a violation of duty,
or that its loss involves greater apparent hardship in one case than
another, unless it appears in addition that there is some specific,
recognized equity founded on some agreement, or the relation of
the debt to the assigned property, which entitles the claimant,
according to equitable principles, to preferential payment." I
As the right of a trust claim to preference depends, not upon the
mere nature of the claim, but upon the fact that the trust funds, or
their proceeds, have gone into the insolvent estate, and still remain
a part thereof, it follows that the important question in every case
must be as to what constitutes a sufficient tracing and identification
of such funds. There has undoubtedly been a material liberalizing,
within recent years, of the rule in regard to the following of trust
property. Formerly such property could be followed only so long
as specific identification was possible and the rights of the bona fde
purchaser for value and without notice, had not intervened. The
equity attached only to the property misappropriated. The first
change in the rule subjected the proceeds of the property to the
equitable claim, provided their identification as proceeds were pos-
sible; but if the proceeds became confused with other property of
the same kind, so as not to be distinguishable as proceeds, the
right to follow was lost. If, for example, the trust property were
turned into money, and the money were mixed with the personal
funds of the trustee, by being deposited in a bank to the credit of
his personal account, the identity of the trust property was held to
have been lost. Money can have no ear-mark, and by a mingling
of it, its identity is gone. This was the argument. Some of the
American courts still adhere to this rule. 2
But what has been called "the modern doctrine of equity" has
changed the old rule to the extent that confusion of funds "does not
destroy the equity entirely, but converts it into a charge upon the
entire mass, giving to the party injured by the unlawful diversion a
1 Matter of Caviu v. Gleason, 105 N.Y. 256.262; Slater v. Oriental Mills. 18 R. .352. 27 Ati
Rep. 443.
2 Union National Bank of 'Chicago v. Goetz, 138 li. 127, 32 Am. St. Rep. 119; Wetherell
v. O'Brien, 140 Ill. 146; Mutual Accident Association v. Jacobs, 141 l. 261; Bayer v. American
Trust & Savings Bank, 157 ni1. 62: Lanterman v. Travous, 174 111. 459; Thompson's Appeal.
22 Pa. St. 16; Goodell v. Buck, 67 Me. 514; Portland etc. Steamboat Company v. Locke, 73 Me"
370.
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priority of right over the other creditors of the possessor."' In
order, however, that a priority of right may be sustained, the prop-
erty impressed with the trust, or its proceeds, must be traced to the
mass.
This modem doctrine in regard to the tracing of trust funds is
now very generally followed in this country. Although it had been
decided as early as 1853 in England that the rights of a cestui que
trust to the funds of the trust could not be defeated by a mingling
of such funds with others of a like nature belonging to the trustee
personally,2 the subject did not receive an elaborate review there
until 1879, when the case of Knatchbull v. Hallelt was decided by
the Court of Appeal. 3 The impetus that the doctrine has received
in this country is undoubedly due in a large degree to the vigorous
judgment in that case of Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls.
The fiduciary relation in the case grew out of bailment and agency.
Bonds in the hands -of a solicitor were without authority sold by
him and the proceeds deposited to the credit of his personal account
at his banker's. At the time of his death this money was in the
bank, mingled with his own funds. The beneficiary claimed to be
entitled to receive the amount of the proceeds of the bonds out of
the money in the hands of the bankers at the time of the solicitor's
death. In the course of his judgment upon this state of facts, the
Master of the Rolls explains what he calls the "modern doctrine of
equity" in regard to the tracing of trust funds. The scope of the
rule, as formulated by this distinguished equity judge, and the
reasbning upon which he bases his conclusions can best be given in
his own language:
"The modern doctrine of equity as regards property disposed of by persons
in a fiduciary position is a very clear and well-established doctrine. Youcan,
if the sale was rightful, take the proceeds of the sale, if you can identify
them. If the sale was wrongful, you can still take the proceeds of the sale,
in a sense adopting the sale for the purpose of taking the proceeds, if you
can identify them. There is no distinction, therefore, between a rightful and
a wrongful disposition of the property, so far as regards the right of the
beneficial owner to follow the proceeds. But it very often happens that you
cannot identify the proceeds. The proceeds may have been invested together
with money belonging to the person in a fiduciary position, in a purchase.
He may have bought land with it, for.[instance, or he may have bought
chattels with it. Now, what is the position of the beneficial owner as regards
such purchases? I will, first of all, take his position when the purchase is
1 Frelinghuysen v. Nugent, 36 Fed. Rep. 229, 239.
2 Pennell v. Deffell, 4 )e Gex, Mac Naughten & Gordon, 372.
3 Knatchbull v. Hallett, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696.
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clearly made with what I will call, for shortness, the trust money, although
it is not confined, as I will show presently, to express trusts. In that case,
according to the now well-established doctrine of. equity, the beneficial owner
has a right to elect either to take the property purchased, or to hold it as
security for the amount of the trust money laid out in the purchase; or, as we
generally express it, he is entitled at his election to take the property, or to'
have a charge on the property for the amount of the trust money. But in the
second case, where a trustee has mixed the money with his own, there is this
distinction, that the cestui que trust, or beneficial owner, can no longer elect
to take the property, because it is no longer bought with the trust money
simply and purely, but with a mixed fund. He is, however, entitled to a
charge on the property purchased for the amount of the trust money laid out
in the purchase; and that charge is quite independent of the fact of the
amount laid out by the trustee. The moment you get a substantial portion of
it furnished by the trustee, using the word 'trustee' in the sense I have men-
tioned, as including all persons in a fiduciary relation, the right to the charge
follows. That is the modern doctrine of equity." ...... "The
moment you establish the fiduciary relation, the modern rules of equity, as
regards following trust money, apply." ..... . "If the bailee sells
the goods bailed, the bailor can in equity follow the proceeds wherever they
can be distinguished, either being actually kept separate, or being mixed up
with'other moneys. I have only to advert to one other point, and that is this:
-supposing, instead of being invested in the purchase of land or goods, the
moneys were simply mixed with other moneys of the trustee, using the term
again in its full sense as including every person in a fiduciary relation, does
it make any difference according to the modern doctrine of equity? I say
none. It would be very remarkable if it were to do so. Supposing the trust
money was 1000 sovereigns, and the trustee put them into a bag, and by mis-
take or accident or otherwise, dropped a sovereign of his own into the bag.
Could anybody suppose that a judge in equity would find any difficulty in
saying that the cestui que trust has a right to take 1000 sovereigns out of that
bag? I do not like to call it a charge of 1000 sovereigns on the 1001 sov-
ereigns, but that is the effect of it. It would make no difference if, instead of
one sovereign it was another 1000 sovereigns; but if instead of putting it into
his bag, he carries the bag to his bankers, what then? According to law, the
bankers are his debtors for the total amount; but if you lend the trust money
to a third person, you can follow it. If in the case supposed the trustee had
lent the 1000 pounds to a man without security, you could follow the debt,
and take it from the debtor. If he lent it on a promissory note, you could
take the promissory note; or the bond, if it were a bond. If, instead of
lending the whole amount, in one sum simply, he had added a sovereign, or
had added 500 pounds of his own to the 1000 pounds, the only difference is
this, that instead of taking the bond or the promissory note, the cestui que
trust would have a charge for the amount of the trust money on the bond or
promissory note. So it would be on the simple contract debt; that is, if the
debt were of such a nature as that, between the creditor and the debtor, you
could not sever the debt into two, so as to shew what part was trust money,
then the cestui que trust would have a right to a charge upon the whole.
Therefore, there is no difficulty in following out the rules of equity and decid-
ing that in case of a mere bailee . . . . you can follow the money."
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It is also decided in this case that if a person holding money in a
fiduciary capacity deposits it to the credit of his personal account,
and thereby mixes it with his own money, and afterwards draws
out sums by checks in the ordinary manner, he must be taken to
haye drawn out his own money in preference to the trust money.
The doctrine of Knatchbull v. Hallett, although probably more
liberal than anything upon the subject previously announced from
the bench, and perhaps, for that reason, entitled to be called "mod-
em," is not a departure in principle from the old rule. It recog-
nizes that the basis of the preferential trust claim must be trust
property, not necessarily trust property that can be identified in
specie or in a substituted form, but trust property that can at least
be identified as having gone into a larger mass and as still remain-
ing a part thereof. The case holds, in effect, that where specific
identification becomes impossible, because the property is no longer
ear-marked, equity will furnish a means of ascertainment by im-
pressing a lien upon the entire mass into which the trust property
has been traced. The trust claim, under such circumstances, is
preferred, not because it is a trust claim, but because it is attached
to property that through the processes of equity is capable of ascer-
tainment. The doctrine of this case simply enforces, through the
refinement of equity, the fundamental principle of the old rule under
conditions that formerly were generally thought to be such as to
make the enforcement impracticable.
The supreme court of the United States, approving and following
the case of Knalchbull v. Hallelt, holds that the trust quality of
funds collected by an agent is not destroyed by his depositing them
in a bank and thereby mingling them with his own funds; that
the principal, in that case an insurance company, might enforce its
beneficial ownership in the funds as against the bank, which claimed
a lien thereon for a debt due to it, from the agent the circumstances
of the casebeingsuch as to charge the bank with notice of the agency.
"This doctrine of equity, "says the court,'"is modern onlyin the sense
of its being a consistent and logical extension of a principle origi-
nating in the very idea of trusts, for they can only be preserved by
a strict enforcement of the rule that forbids one holding a trust rela-
tion from making private use of trust property."'
Ordinarily, of course, the deposit of funds in a bank creates the
relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the person
I National Bank v. Insurance Company. 104 U. S. 54.
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making the deposit; and the fact that the deposit is of trust funds
does ,lot necessarily change the relation, even though the bank has
notice of the character of the deposit. In order that the relation
may become one of trust so that the depositor may have a preferen-
tial claim upon the funds of the bank, it must appear either that -a
trust has been raised in invilum on account of the fraud of the
bank, or that the deposit was a special one, or that the circumstances
of the deposit were such as to make it special in effect although not
so in form. 1
This modern doctrine in regard to the tracing of trust funds has
been very generally recognized and applied in this country.' The
doctrine itself is simple, but its application is often difficult. In
many cases the rule, though approved, is not applied because of
the failure of the cestui que b ust to show that the estate of the
insolvent contains the proceeds of the trust property. 3 The limits
of this article will not admit of any systematic review of the Amer-
icau cases upon the subject. Nothing will be attempted except a
brief description of some of the situations to which the doctrine has
been applied by our courts and the discussion of a few cases in
which it has been arbitrarily extended beyond the reasons that
support it.
The principle of the modern rule is frequently invoked where
commercial paper has been deposited with a bank for collection, and
the bank is either hopelessly insolvent at the time or becomes
insolvent while holding the paper or the proceeds thereof. The
question in such a case is as to whether or not a trust relation that
will entitle the owner of the paper to a preferential claim as against
general creditors has been raised. If the title to the paper passes
to the bank, the former owner, in the absence of fraud on the part
of the bank, loses all interest therein and in the proceeds thereof.
In case of insolvency he becomes simply a general creditor. For
1 Paul v. Draper, 158 Mo. 197, 59 S. W. Rep. 77.
2 See, for example. Van Alen v. American National Bank, 52 N. Y. 1; Newtdn v. Porter.
69 N. Y. 133; Ferris v. Van Vechten. 73 N. Y. 113; People v. City Bank of Rochester. 96 N. Y.
32; Matter of Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 256; American Sugar Refining Co. v. Pancher, 145
N. y. 552; Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank v. King.57 Pa. St. 202; First National Bank
v. Hummel. 14 Col. 259; Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Hawkins, 74 Fed. Rep. 395; Harrison v.
Smith. 83 Mo. 210, 53 Am. Rep. 571; Carley v. Graves, 85 Mich. 483; Board of Fire and Water
Commissioners of Marquette v. Wilkinson, 119 Mich. 655, 44 L. R. A. 493; Neely v. Rood. 54
Mich. 134.
3 nnglar v. Offutt. 70 Md. 78; Sherwood v. Milford Bank, 94 Mich. 78: Slater v. Oriental
Mills. 18 R. I. 352; Shields v. Thomas, 71 Miss. 260; Ferchen v. Arndt. 26 Ore. 121, 46 Am. St.
Rep. 603; Little v. Chadwick, 151 Mass. 10): Philadelphia National Bank v. Dowd, 38 Fed
Rep. 172. 2 L. R. A. 480 and note.
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example, if, by agreement, either express or implied, the collecting
bank at once, upon receiving paper for collection, credits it to the
account of the depositor, and the latter has the right at once to draw
against it, the relation established is that of debtor and creditor. 1
That relation, however, cannot be raised simply by the act of the
collecting bank in treating the paper as a general deposit. It
results only from an express or implied agreement. Where the
course of dealing between two banks shows a custom of mutual
credits of paper sent for collection, the amounts collected by each
being mingled with its general funds, the relation between them in
regard to such amounts is that of debtor and creditor. 1 But when
commercial paper is accepted by a bank simply for collection, the
bank acts in the capacity of an agent, and if the proceeds of the
paper can be shown to form a part of the assets in the hands of a
receiver, the one for whom the collection has been made will be
held to be a preferred creditor by reason of the trust relation. 2 But
it has been held that where money collected by a bank under
instructions to make the collection and return the proceeds at once,
is allowed to remain for several months with the collecting bank
which becomes insolvent without having returned the funds, the
bank for which the collection was made will be treated as an ordi -
nary creditor. 3 This decision was based upon the fact that identi-
fication had become impossible.
While it is undoubtedly the law that upon a deposit in a bank, in
the ordinary course of business, of money, or of drafts or checks,
the title to the money or to the drafts or checks passes immediately
to the bank, yet if such deposit is made when the bank is irretriev-
ably insolvent, its officers knowing of its condition, a fraud is prac-
ticed upon the depositor that changes the relation to that of trust.
Under such circumstances the deposit or the proceeds, if in the
assets of the bank or in the hands of any one who is not a bona fide
holder for value, may be reclaimed by the depositor. 4
The relation of partners to one another in regard to the partner-
ship property being of a fiduciary character, it not infrequently
1 Franklin Co. National Bank v. Beal. 49 Fed. Rep. 606.
2 State v. Bank of Commerce of Grand Island, 61 Neb., 181-85 N. W. Rep. 43; Blair 2,.
Hill, 50 App. Div. (N. Y.) 33, affirmed 165 N. Y. 672; Nat'l B. & D. Bank v. Hubbell, 117 N. Y.
384; Jones et al. v. Kilbreth, 49 Ohio St. 401; Kansas State Bank v, First State Bank, 62 Kans.
788, 64 Pac. Rep. 634.
3 Philadelphia National Bank v. Dowd, 38 Fed. Rep. 172, 2 1. R. A. 480.
4 Cragie v. Hadley, 99 N. V. 131; Atkinson -v. Rochester Printing Co., 114 N. Y. 168: Im-
porters' & Traders' Nat. Bank v. Peters, 123 N. Y. 272; Standard Oil Co. of Ky. z. Hawkins,
74 Fed. Rep. 395; Hyland v. Roe. 111 Wis. 61.
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happens that the application of the modern rule as to the tracing
of trust funds becomes necessary in the settlement of partnership
affairs. The partnership relation is one that calls for the exercise
of the greatest good faith. The wronged partner is always entitled
to the same remedy that would exist in behalf of the ceshui que trust
in the case of a regularly constituted trust relation. He has the
right, therefore, to follow partnership funds that have been wrong-
fully used by a copartner and to follow property into which they
have been converted, together with the increased value thereof,
provided ascertainment within the requirements of the rule is possi-
ble and the rights of the bona fide purchaser for value have not
intervened. Through the application of these principles, it was
held in Holmes v. Gilman' that where a member of a firm without
authority used the funds of the firm to procure insurance on his
life for the benefit of his wife, paying the premiums of the policies
wholly out of such funds until his death, the surviving member, as
the representative of the partnership, was entitled to the whole
amount of the insurance, the amount thereof being less than the
amount of the firm funds misappropriated.
A preferential lien, through the medium of the implied trust, will
be declared in favor of a defrauded vendor of goods, where it
appears that he has no adequate remedy at law, and the proceed-
of the goods are clearly traced to the hands of the fraudulent and
insolvent vendee, or his assignee for the benefit of creditors. In
a recent leading case in which this question was involved, it
appeared that goods had been sold upon fraudulent representations
by the purchasers as to their financial standing. The fraud was
clearly shown, and, indeed, was not controverted. Among the
assigned assets were some of the goods sold. These were replevied
by the vendor. But prior to the assignment, the fraudulent vendees
had sold upon credit to numerous persons, in the ordinary course
of trade, portions of the goods, and claims against the sub -vendees
arising out of such sales, aggregating a considerable amount, passed
to the hands of the assignee. After the assignment, these claims
were collected by the assignee. The proceeds in his hands were
capable of ascertainment. Excepting as to a small sum, these col-
lections were made after notice of rescission for fraud of the orig-
inal sale and a demand for the goods sold that were then in the
possession of the assignee and for an accounting and the delivery to
the defrauded vendor of the outstanding claims against the sub-
I Holmes v. Gilman. 138 N. Y. 369. 2
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vendees. An interlocutory judgment making the assignee a trustee
of the proceeds and ordering him to "account for, tiansfer and pay
over to the plaintiff all of said proceeds," was sustained by the
court of last resort. I The principle upon which the decision was
based is that through the fraud of the vendees a trust was raised in
favor of the vendor that attached to the property which was the sub-
ject matter of the transaction and to the ascertainable proceeds
thereof in the hands of the fraudulent vendees, and that so far as
this property or the proceeds passed to the assignee, it passed
impressed with this trust. The trust had not been rendered inef-
fective by the dissipation of the property and its proceeds. Priority
was given, not by reason of the character of the claim but by reason
of the equitable ownership of the property and proceeds. "The
court in such cases lays hold of the substituted property and fol-
lows the original fund, through all the changes it has undergone,
until the power of identification is lost or the rights of bona fide
purchasers stop the pursuit, and holds it in its grasp to indemnify
the innocent victim of the fraud. And even in the case of money,
which is said to have no ear-mark, its identity will not be deemed
lost, though it is mingled with other money of the wrongdoer, if
it can be shown that it forms a part of the general mass." It was
urged in this case in denial of the power of the court of equity to
impound the proceeds for the benefit of the defrauded vendor, that
to admit such an equitable principle into commercial transactions
would be contrary to public policy. But as to this the court says
that, safeguarded by the limitations that "it must appear that the
plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law, either in consequence of
insolvency, the dispersion of the property or other cause, and that
nothing will be adjudged as proceeds except what can be specific-
ally identified as such, business interests will have adequate pro-
tection," and further that "the disturbance would be much less
than is now permitted in following the property from hand to hand
until a bona fide purchaser is found."
In case it appears that before the rescission of a sale induced by
the fraud of the vendee, the subject matter thereof has passed into
the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and that
the proceeds of the re-sale cannot be traced to the estate of the
insolvent, equity will not impress that estate with a lien for the
benefit of the seller. His right to preference being based solely
upon an equitable interest in property, raised through the fraud of
. 1 American Sugar Refining Co. v. Fancher, 145 N. Y. 552.
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the vendee, it logically follows that the right must disappear with
the dissipation of the property. 1 Whenever the trust property or
the trust fund resulting therefrom has passed beyond the reach of
the court, the right to preference is gone. 2
This modern rule in regard to the tracing of trust funds is clearly
within well settled equitable principles. The danger lies in its
application. If in this the courts would always keep within the
reason of the rule, and would not attempt, on account of some vague
equity that a case may present, to extend the doctrine beyond its
legitimate field, there would be little uncertainty or confusion.
Unfortunately, however, a few courts, enthusiastic, perhaps, to
contribute something to the "progressive, refined and improved"
doctrines of equity, have, in their application of the rule, carried it
to an extreme that fails of support in principle and that leads
inevitably to most illogical and inequitable results.
In 1884, the court of appeals of the State of New York pro-
nounced a decision that apparently extended the preferential trust
lien to the general estate of the insolvent, even though the trust
funds could not be specifically traced to the estate, if such funds
had gone into the business of the insolvent and so benefited the
estate. 3 The profession very generally understood this to be the
effect of the decision, and several courts of last resort, undoubtedly
influenced by it, announced this as a proper extension of the mod-
ern rule. It appears, in this case, that a firm, having discounted
certain notes at a bank where it was a depositor and desiring to
anticipate payment, gave to the bank its checks for the amount of
the notes, $8000, less rebate of interest; that the bank charged
the checks in the firm account and made an entry in the bank
books to the effect that the notes had been paid. At that time the
firm supposed that the bank held the notes, but they had, in fact,
been previously sold. Before the notes became due and about a
month after the giving of the checks, the bank' failed, and a
receiver was appointed. The bank did not pay the notes and the
receiver refused to do so without an order of the court. It does
not appear that a specific fund was set aside for that purpose by the
bank.
The receiver found "in the vaults of the bank considerably less
than $8000," how much less is not disclosed, but before the peti-
1 See Farwell v. Kloman, 45 Neb. 424. 63 N. W. Rep. 798.
2 Union Nat'l Bank of chicago v. Goetz. 138 11. 127.32 Am. St. Rep. 119.
3 The People v. The City Bank of Rochester, 96 N. Y. 32.
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tion for the payment of the notes had been presented to the court,
he had received about $75,000. There is nothing in the reported
case to show that the proceeds of the checks given by the firm, or
anything representing them, passed into the hands of the receiver.
The court held that the transaction created a trust relation between
the firm and the bank, the violation of which constituted a fraud by
which the bank could not profit; "that the checks were impressed
with a trust, and no change of them into any other shape could
diviest it so as to give the bank or its receiver any different or more
valid claim in respect to them than the bank had before the conver-
sion ;" and that an order requiring the receiver to pay the notes out
of the funds in his hands was properly granted. In 1887, this
court, in considering the question of trust preferences, held that to
entitle the trustcreditor to preference, it must appear that the prop-
erty of the insolvent remaining for distribution includes the trust
fund or its proceeds. In the course of the opinion, it is said that
the case of Peofile v. City Bank of Rochester, seems to have been
misunderstood; that it was not claimed in that case that the proceeds
the checks "had not gone into the general funds of the bank, or
that they had not passed in some form to the receiver. The court
did not decide that the petitioners would have been entitled to a
preference in case the proceeds of the checks had been used by the
bank, and were not represented in its assets in the hands of a
receiver.' " The court by this later decision puts into the case
of People v. City Bank of Rochester an element that, to say the
least, *does not distinctly appear in the reported decision, and
declared a rule as to preference arising from trust relations that is
based upon principle.
But before the publication of the explanatory decision, the appar-
ent doctrine of People v. City Bank of Rochester had gained head -
way in the courts. In McLeod v. Evans2 the supreme court of
Wisconsin held that the owner of a draft left with a banker for col-
lection was entitled by reason of the trust relation raised by the
agency and the fraud of the banker, to a preferential lien upon
the estate of the banker in the hands of his assignee for
the benefit of creditors, even though the proceeds of the draft
formed no part of the estate, it appearing that such proceeds had
been used in paying debts of the insolvent. The reasoning upon
which this conclusion rests, is that as the trust fund had been uses
1 In Matter of Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 226.
2 McLeod v. "vans, Assignee, 66 Wis. 401.
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by the insolvent in the payment of debts, the estate in the hands of
the assignee was thereby increased by that amount, and in equity
should be impressed with a lien to the extent of the fund. "Beyond
all controversy," says the court, "the proceeds of the draft.
were a trust fund. He (the banker) having used them
in his business, having benefited his estate by such use, as we must
assume, a trust attaches to that estate which came to the defendant
under the assignment." The reasoning is plausible but unsound.
It ignores the fundamental principle that the very life of the trust
relation as the basis of a preferential claim depends upon the exist-
ence of property, impressed with the trust, that is capable of
specific identification or that is a part of a larger mass. It assumes
that the payment of debts by the insolvent, with trust funds, would
increase the assets that went into the hands of the assignee, to an
extent that would make the allowance of a lien upon the general
estate in favor of the cestui que trust for the amount of his claim
just and equitable, an assumption that the situation fails to sustain.
The payment of debts would in a general way benefit the estate by
increasing the per cent that creditors would receive. But in case of
a badly insolvent estate, like the one under consideration, the
extent of the benefit, as suggested by Judge Cassoday in his vigor-
ous dissenting opinion, would be very much less than the amount
of the trust claim. In reality, the use of the trust funds in the pay-
ment of individual debts would not increase at all the estate passing
to the hands of the insolvent's assignee. It would simply change
the indebtedness. The cestui que trust would become a creditor in
place of the creditors that had been paid with the trust funds. It
must be apparent, as suggested by the supreme court of Rhode
Island, that the satisfaction of one debt by incurring another of
equal amount, neither decreases one's liabilities nor increases his
assets.'
But the supreme court of Wisconsin, after following the doctrine
of McLeod v. Evans in the cases cited, Judges Cassoday and
Taylor always recording their dissent, finally overruled its
former decisions, and placed itself squarely in line with the doctrine
that in order that a trust claim may be entitled to preference, it
must at least appear that the property of the insolvent includes
proceeds of the trust estate; that the use of such proceeds in the
payment of the debts of the insolvent does not raise an equity in
1 See Slater v. Oriental Mills, 18 R. 1. 352, 27 Atl. Rep. 443; Francis v. e vans, 69 Wis. 115.
dissenting opinion, 33 N. W. Rep. 93; Bowers v. evans, 71 Wis. 133, 138, dissenting opinion.
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favor of the trust claimant as against the general creditors.' In
subsequent cases this court has steadily adhered to this doctrine.2
The supreme court of Kansas in Peak v. Ellicott, decided in
1883, apparently carried the modern doctrine to an extent that can-
not be justified by principle. It held in that case that the deposit
of a fund with a bank with instructions that it be used by way of
anticipating the payment of a note given to the bank by the deposi-
tor creates a trust relation between the depositor and the bank in
regard to this specific fund. To this extent the decision was
undoubtedly correct. But the court further held that upon an
assignment by the bank for the benefit of its creditors, the deposi-
tor had the right to reclaim from the assignee the amount of the
fund to be paid out of assets in his hands, although it does not
appear in the reported case that any part of the fund could be traced
to the assets that passed to the assignee. 3  That the modern doc-
trine, according to this court, does not necessarily involve at least
the tracing of the trust fund into a larger mass of property of the
same kind, is apparent from its opinion in the subsequent case of.
Meyers v. The Board of Education.' In this case the court held that
a board of education had a preferred right over general creditors to
assets in the hands of an assiznee of an insolvent bank, where the
deposit of the funds of the board was made by its treasurer, who
was also cashier of the bank, without special authority from the
board, the owner of the brink knowing the character of the funds,
even though no part of the funds passed to the assignee, they hav-
ing been wrongfully used 'in the business of the bank and in the
payment of indebtedness against it. But the Kansas court, in a
latei- case, while not formally overruling Meyers v. Board of Educa-
tion and Hubbard v. The Irrigation Co., declared that these cases
carried "the doctrine of the impressibility of insolvent estates with
trusts to the full length." The doctrine of the court was re'stated
as follows: "The fund itself, or something into which it has gone,
and which stands as its representative, must be on hand, subject to
identification and separable from the general assets, in order to
charge the assignee with the trust; or, if the fund has been so
commingled with the general assets as to be incapable of identifica-
tion or tracing, the estate which came to the assignee must have
1 Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders, 87 Wis. 237.
2 See Burnham v. Barth. 89 Wis. 362; Thuemmler v. Barth, S9 Wis. 381; Stevens v. Williams,
91 Wis. 58: Dowie v. Humphrey, 91 Wis. 98; Hyland v. Roe, 111 Wis. 361.
3 Peak v. Ellicott. 30 Kans. 156.
4 Meyers v. Board of Education of City of Clay Center, 51 Kans. 87; see also, Hubbard v.
The Irrigation Co. 53 Kans. 637.
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been augmented or bettered, in an appreciable and tangible way, in
order to charge it with the trust. The mere saving of the estate by
the discharge of general indebtedness otherwise payable out of it,
or by the payment of the current expenses of the business, is not an
augmentation or betterment of the estate, within the meaning of the
rule. If the estate has not been increased by specific additions to it,
or if what ,previously existed has not been improved or rendered
more valuable, it has not been impressed with the trust claimed." '
This restated doctrine was recognized and followed in the subse-
quent case of Kansas State Bank v. First State Bank.2  It is to be
regretted that the abandonment by this court of an indefensible
position was not complete. The language used in the restatement
of the doctrine of the court is such as to leave an opportunity for
misunderstanding and confusion. To say that in order that a pref-
erential trust claim may be enforced against the estate of an insol-
vent, the estate through the use of trust funds by the insolvent
"must have been augmented or bettered in an appreciable and
tangible way," is to set indefinite and probably changing limitations
upon the former doctrine of the court, particularly in view of the
fact that Meyers v. Board of Education and Hubbard v. The Irriga-
tion Company are distinguished " rather than criticized as contain-
ing any error of decision.' And the danger of confusion is but
partially averted by the statement that the saving to the estate by
the payment of general indebtedness or current expenses out of
trust funds, "is not an augmentation or betterment of the estate,
within the meaning of the rule."
The doctrine of the Iowa supreme court in regard to preferential
trust claims, as given in the Daventport Plow Company v. Lampi.3
is not less extreme than that promulgated in the earlier Wisconsin
and Kansas cases. In this case the treasurer of the plaintiff cor-
poration made an unauthorized loan of funds to another corporation,
the defendant's assignor, the president of the latter corporation
well knowing that the loan was without authority. The money so
obtained was mingled with the funds of the defendant's assignor,
and was used to pay its debts. None of the funds loaned,
or their proceeds, came to the hands of the assignee for
the benefit of creditors. It was held that the funds loaned
were, under the circumstances, impressed with a irust, and
1 Insurance Co. v. Caldwell. 59 Kans. 156. 158. 52 Pac. Rep. 440.
2 Kansas State Bank v. First State Bank, 62 Kans. 788, 64 Pac. Rep. 634.
3See The Davenport Plow Company v. Tamp. 80 Iowa, 722.
HeinOnline  -- 1 Mich. L. Rev. 15 1902-1903
MICHIGAN LA W REVIEW
that as they were used by the defendant's assignor in its business
and in the payment of its debts, it became liable " to replace the
trust funds with other money in its possession or with money real-
ized out of other property," and that the assignee was under obliga-
tions to pay the loan in full out of the assets in his hands before
making a pro rala distribution to the other creditors.' The doctrine
of the Iowa court was somewhat modified by a subsequent case in
which the court said: " We do not think it is necessary to trace
the deposit into any specific property in the hands of the assignee in
order to establish a trust, but it should be shown, presumptively
at least, that the estate in his hands has been augmented by the
trust fund. The equities of the plaintiff as against property to
which its money contributed nothing, directly or indirectly, are no
greater than those of the general creditor.''2 It is hardly necessary
to suggest that the change amounts to but little in the way of
putting the court upon a sound basis in regard to preferential trust
liens.' However, the court goes furthel in the right direction in
the subsequent cases of Jbnes v. Chesebrouglz, and Bradley v. Chese-
brouglh.
4
It is apparent that in a few courts the modern doctrine as to the
tracing of trust funds has been carried to an extent that cannot be
justified by reason or authority. The courts that have gone to an
extreme in this matter have doubtless been unduly influenced by
what they have considered to be the superior equity attaching to a
trust claim. Trust property is held for the benefit of the cestui g.ue
trust, and the conscience of the trustee is charged with a duty which a
court of equity should enforce, whenever it can do so without infring-
ing upon the rights of others, by compelling the trustee to account for
the property in accordance with the obligations of the trust. This
the court of equity can always do when the trustee is solvent, and
when he is insolvent, the court can do it, if the trust property is
ascertainable as a part of his estate; but, where the trust property
has been dissipated, the trust claim can have preference as against
general creditors only upon the theory that the nature of the claim
entitles it to special consideration, a theory that is based upon
sentiment, and not upon principle, and that fails to recognize the
binding force of the maxim that equality is equity.
H. B. HUTCHINS
1 See also The Independent District of Boyer v. King. 80 Iowa, 497.
2 District Township of Eureka v. Farmers' Bank, 88 Iowa, 194.
3 See, also. Thompson v. Gloucester City Savings Institute, 8 At. Rep. (N. J.) 97.
4 Jones v. Chesebrough, 105 Iowa. 303; Bradley v. Chesebrough, 111 Iowa, 126.
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